

~~SECRET~~7 May 64 *wpr*

PKE

FYI, comments, ~~other~~ suggestions, etc.

Attached is outline, in considerable detail, of parts I, II, and III of <sup>Study</sup> "Transition" <sup>CA</sup> on which I am meanwhile ~~drafting~~ engaged in drafting;

and former outline of ~~it~~ last January, on which I have been building revisions.

Parts I, II, and III (sub-chapters) <sup>will</sup> replace <sup>what was planned on</sup> parts of pages 1 and 2 of the old outline, attached.

Still coming up, are the outlines (and drafting too) for the remaining "parts", somewhat as follows:

~~IX~~

IV: Change and Continuity, Feb. 1961-March 1962 (~~from Dulles to first~~ DCI Dulles, then DCI McCone, ~~working~~ <sup>both</sup> in relation to NSC etc. during Kennedy's first year) — *comparison and contrast*.

V: Changes of Command within CIA and USIB (major changes of leadership, of management policy and reorganization), 1961-1962. General considerations; also separate sub-chapters, possibly, for DD/I, DD/P, DD/S and DD/R-S/T (?)

VI: CIA's Changing Image, 1961-63 ~~etc~~ (particularly at Presidential, Congressional, and "public" levels of appreciation and criticism)

VI: Transition Epilogue, November 1963: CIA in the National Emergency of Kennedy's Assassination and Johnson's Takeover.

*impressive but kaleidoscopic, because it does touch so many facets so briefly. Suppose text will make it seem simpler by bringing out relationships & continuities. Your use of provocative quotation marks also makes for jumpy reading in the outline.*

*No particular suggestions except a probably unnecessary warning not to give too much attention to matters of only tangential or background significance for the story of CIA-DCI.*

~~Secret~~

7 May 1966

IV. Intelligence Change and Continuity, Feb. 1961-March 1962 (President Kennedy's first year)

1. CIA and President Kennedy's "personal style" in national-security matters: his reputed appetite for intelligence "information" and foreign policy "advice," never fully satiated; his alleged preference for the telephone, the private conversation, the first-hand visit, etc., and his temperamental impatience with orderly "paper work" and "organization"; ~~and~~ his long experience, in public and private deliberations, with the Nation's foreign policy and national security problems. Whatever the "legend" and the "fact," the following situations emerged during his first year ~~which both tested his capacity and/or which he used to test the capacities of his Intelligence organization to meet his needs.~~
2. CIA Support relationships with new Administration, Jan.-April 1961 (up to Cuban Bay of Pigs)

New White House secretariat: Bundy and Clifton, of initial CIA interest, then also Rostow and others; Salinger, too, had been DCI's first liaison with the would-be President--unusual, considering that he was the most "non-secret" of the entire entourage!

Proliferation of additional Presidential assistants (replacing the earlier proliferation of campaign and post-campaign "task forces"): some of them worked on so-called domestic matters, others foreign, but almost ~~hardly any of them did not have~~ all of them had job sheets that had "world image" ramifications for the U.S. (and the new Administration), and hence required a measure of intelligence attention. Examples: Sorensen, Feldman, Dungan, Dutton, O'Donnell, Goodwin, Schlesinger, Wiesner, McGovern, and "even" Letitia Baldrige. CIA's big party, for the top brass, in first ~~weeks~~ <sup>days</sup> carefully selected handful of Kennedy's entourage.

Liaison finally established (re-established) with Vice President Johnson, a man of many hats, and a man of ~~many~~ several "pasts" with CIA, and a man destined for a ~~man presently~~ currently in 1961 of several hats, and a man destined to have a future then undreamed of, and presumably not planned for (either in or out of CIA, by the "emergency planning" experts et al).

Briefing of new cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, selected independent-agency heads, and a few other special men (and women?) in the New Frontier--most of them controlling Departmental intelligence assets, even (of course) among the non-USIB agencies. Some of them, like some of the White House secretariats, had the special credentials (for CIA) of having been veterans of OSS, CIG, CIA; or military intelligence: hence the briefing of them was somewhat differently scheduled and presented, (Re-check briefing notes, in DDP and DDI files especially) and DD/S Personnel (Re-established)

3. CIA Command Relationships with State, Defense, and Other USIB Principals:

Initial special briefings, before Inauguration, to Rusk and McNamara. Further liaison with their chief assistants, e.g. Gilpatric et al.

Ambassadorial briefings were accelerated, Feb.-March 1961: of special interest because they, of course, were US or Repts with special

order of Nov. 8, 1960 (re-check); some were old-line

Responsible to President  
Attending and all other  
"insider" (politicians)

Likewise, there were a few (relatively fewer) overseas military command changes, ~~that required~~ involving U.S. Sr Rep status (re-check) or Washington command-channel status ~~alternation~~ (e.g. Lemnitzer replacing Twining <sup>already in fall 1960</sup>), which ~~that~~ required special CIA "handling", from command-relationship view point.

Defense Department, furthermore, was on the eve of reorganizing its extensive intelligence assets, with McNamara's blessing (re-check), per JSG recommendation, <sup>early 1961</sup>: special liaison at CIA <sup>via Kirkpatrick and Balmer?</sup>

USIB principals changed, somewhat, early in 1961: notably Hilsman and Hughes, ~~at State~~, replacing Cumming and Eltinge <sup>at State -- leadership passed to</sup>

~~Although ~~many~~ not all changes were "political", they were all part of the climate atmosphere of change in 1961. (e.g., military chiefs who were being "rotated"--recheck re validity of rotation-of-duty) they all were part of the 1961 atmosphere of "change"; and they all required special "attention" of CIA and DCI, both through the USIB mechanisms and ~~and~~ through informal measures to ~~to~~ establish ~~some~~ comfortable team work in the Community, ~~at~~ ~~in~~ ~~head~~ ~~quarters~~ ~~and~~ ~~abroad~~.~~

~~also at Navy (Kearny for Frost), also NSA (Frost for Sanford); ~~which were~~ not presumably not "political" but military "rotations" - of - duty "changes"; but USIB "political" ~~changes~~.~~

3. President Kennedy's Early Concern for Modifying the NSC "Machinery" (inspired by "Scoop" Jackson's Senate studies? ~~and~~ other sources?): Experimentation, Jan.- April 1961 (up to Cuban ~~or~~ Bay of Pigs):

NSC meetings: DCI (Dulles) was <sup>of special significance because he was</sup> the only <sup>NSC</sup> member (along with Lay as secretary) who bridged the gap from the old to the new Administration; briefings continued; meetings tapered off, NSC atmosphere bright

NSC membership, pro forma, remained unchanged: Robt Kennedy was not added

NSC secretariat: Bundy (then Bundy and Rostow) in charge ex officio, as Gray had been; Lay as 'executive secretary' ~~soon~~ resigned (Feb. 1961, effective May 1961), leaving Boggs, his assistant, as "act ng"; ~~at~~ later, Bromley Smith took over, when his OCB was abolished; CIA liaison

OCB abolished: but ~~continuing~~ its work was <sup>apparently continued</sup> done under various assumed names, otherwise, by DCI and DOD and State undersecretaries, with Bundy, Rostow, and Bromley Smith, all involved;

Pres. Board for Intelligence was left dormant (not technically abolished), Jan.-April 1961; CIA liaison ~~undisturbed~~, via IG

Committee of Principals (Nuclear Testing), continued as is, probably strengthened rather than weakened, in view of new Administration's announced policy objectives in "disarmament" field; Mc Cloy, then Foster, at new ACDA; with OSI (Scoville) continuing as DCI's chief backstop.

DCI's special responsibilities to the President; both for intelligence <sup>made</sup> for NSC-directed Operations; and "traditionally" by now for President-requested Policy advice; these were all left ~~undisturbed~~ in theory and in practice, in early months, by Kennedy. Illustrated in Cuba, Laos, Western European problems etc etc,

~~Intelligence~~ ~~not~~ ~~far~~ ~~different~~ ~~from~~ ~~what~~ ~~Hilsman's~~ ~~had~~ ~~done~~ ~~in~~ ~~his~~ ~~"~~ ~~Structure~~ ~~of~~ ~~Intelligence~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~NSA~~ ~~"~~ ~~document~~ ~~(~~